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By Jeff Emanuel Posted in Al Qaeda | appeasement | Foreign Affairs | foreign policy | GWOT | Pakistan | Taliban | War — Comments (19) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »

An Erstwhile "Ally" in the War on Terror Sells its Soul for Thirty Pieces of Silver and an Agreement its Enemies will Never Live up to

On February 17, the Pakistani government and the Taliban jointly signed a peace treaty dealing with the North Waziristan region of the Afghan/Pakistani border area (see graphic at right, and click for more detailed map). The agreement was shrouded in secrecy, with its terms being kept under wraps by both parties.

This weekend, a Pakistani news organization, the Daily Times, managed to obtain a copy of the agreement, which they roughly outlined on their web site.

They report that the agreement, "inked between the government and the Utmanzai tribes on February 17 to fight Taliban-linked militancy through support from the local population," contains the following terms:

• • Sharing the agreement’s contents with the media violates the terms laid down in the document [Auth. note: There is no information available yet as to how this leaking of the peace agreement to the Daily Times will affect the overall agreement, given this requirement]
• • "Al Qaeda-linked militants" are allowed to live in North Waziristan "as long as they pledge to remain peaceful"
• • "All foreigners" are required to "leave the area"
• • No "parallel government of suspected Taliban militants" will be tolerated
• • There will be "no attacks on security personnel or government employees" and no "target killings" will be "initiated" [Auth. note: The Daily Times points out that "suspected Taliban militants continue to blow up CD shops in Miranshah and target killings have continued despite the February 17 peace deal"]
• • Any violator of the peace accord will be fined 50 million Pakistani Rupees [Auth. note: Approximately U.S. $742,000]

Read on.

Apparently as part of this agreement, Pakistan released Sufi Mohammed, a senior Taliban leader with ties to Pakistani and Afghan Taliban who had been in custody since 2002.

Not the First (Nor the Last) Pakistan-Taliban Agreement

This is not the first time Pakistan has entered into an agreement with Taliban leaders and related militants in the name of "peace"; rather, it is simply the most recent attempt by the Pakistani government to buy off the al Qaeda and Taliban legions who have spent the last three years conquering northwest Pakistan and turning it into a lawless realm over which they hold sway and in which they can operate unmolested by legal authorities.

Two years ago, a cease-fire was declared between Pakistan and the Taliban -- and, as War on Terror and Counterterrorism experts Bill Roggio and Daveed Gartenstein-Ross wrote in The Weekly Standard, the Taliban has "violated each of the conditions" of those "now-infamous September 2006 Waziristan accords." They continue:

It used the ceasefire as an opportunity to erect a parallel system of government complete with sharia courts, taxation, recruiting offices, and its own police force. Al Qaeda in turn benefited from the Taliban's expansion, building what U.S. intelligence estimates as 29 training camps in North and South Waziristan alone.

As Roggio, writing in The Long War Journal, pointed out in his initial report of the contents of the 2008 Waziristan treaty (the first time the story was reported in America):

The agreement does not mention existing al Qaeda and Taliban terror training camps or the ending of cross-border attacks into Pakistan.

The Taliban established a shadow government after the 2006 peace agreement, and by all accounts it remains in place. The Taliban runs recruiting offices, courts, and jails, taxes the population, and maintains security forces. The Taliban and al Qaeda are known to run 29 training camps in North and South Waziristan.

A similar agreement, between the Pakistani government and the tribal leaders of South Waziristan is reportedly nearing completion and is expected to be signed any day now.

This second truce, which would ostensibly prohibit the Taliban from harboring foreign terrorists, attacking government or military personnel, or hindering the movement of aid workers (all concessions which, as Roggio pointed out, Taliban leaders have ignored in the past), would be accompanied by a complete withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the area, the release of several Pakistani soldiers being held by the Taliban, and the release of several Taliban prisoners currently in Pakistani custody.

A Longstanding Unwillingness to Consistently Oppose Terror

Pakistan's ebbing will to take on those terrorists who threaten both its leaders and its institutions -- not to mention the stability of its northwestern neighbor, which currently faces its best chance at a peaceful future in decades -- is and should be a matter of concern to America, her allies, and others who stand to benefit from success in this key front in the War on Terror.

Thanks in part to the Pakistani government's longstanding unwillingness to consistently deal aggressively with the Taliban's encroachment into their NW border territory, the former Afghan ruling party and its terrorist allies have, for several years now, had a haven to which they can retreat and in which they can regroup and rebuild while planning and preparing offensives and attacks against the coalition in Afghanistan and against governments and countries farther away.

According to Owais Ahmed Ghani, the Governor of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province, the lack of outside threats, combined with a growing income from the opium poppy trade (which is being successfully stemmed in much of the rest of Afghanistan), has provided the Taliban leadership in South Waziristan the time and income to be able to spend at least $45 million -- and possibly as much as $100 million or more -- per year "procuring weapons, equipment, vehicles, treating wounded militants and keeping families of killed militants fed" (though the vast majority goes toward the former three, rather than the latter two). The 9/11 Commission estimated that al Qaeda was spending $30 million per year on weapons and supplies prior to the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks that spurred the U.S. into overt action against global terrorism.

According to the recent NATO report entitled "Progress in Afghanistan" (.pdf), the "broad international effort to help Afghanistan build a more stable and secure future is achievable, and it is being achieved." Unfortunately, work toward that achievement has had to be done in spite of an ever-growing lack of cooperation from the country in the best geographic position to most effectively bolster or undermine the coalition's efforts to establish a successful Afghanistan. The more Pakistan pleads and negotiates from a position of weakness with terrorist organizations that are threatening, the more it reinforces its own vulnerability to the tactics of terror.

Giving in to those who threaten or perpetrate violence does not buy long-term peace, stability, or security; rather, it teaches those doing the threatening that their tactics are effective, and that their actions will be rewarded with concessions and pleas for "peace."

A "Need to Eliminate the Insurgents’ Support Base in Pakistan"

Pakistan has gone from a generally respectable ally in the War on Terror to, over time, a full-blown enabler of al Qaeda and Taliban activity. A study released June 9 by the RAND Corp. entitled "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan" (.pdf) stated that coalition "success in Afghanistan hinges on three factors," one of which is the need of "the United States and other international actors need to eliminate the insurgents’ support base in Pakistan."

The report continues:

The failure to do so will cripple long-term efforts to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan.

Every successful insurgency in Afghanistan since 1979 enjoyed a sanctuary in Pakistan and assistance from individuals within the Pakistan government, such as the Frontier Corps and the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI).

According to the RAND study, "There is some indication that individuals within the Pakistan government...were involved in assisting insurgent groups. Solving this problem will require a difficult political and diplomatic feat: convincing the government of Pakistan to undermine the sanctuary on its soil." (emphasis added)

Far from moving in this positive direction, the repeated offerings of peace and concession being made by Prime Minister Yousaf Razza Gillani and the Pakistani government to the Taliban leaders of the Northwest Frontier Province are not only making Pakistan itself a more dangerous place, but are providing key members of one of the world's most prolific terrorist networks the time, space, and resources to continue planning and executing attacks on both small and large scales.

Replicating the Conditions that Allowed al Qaeda to Flourish in Afghanistan pre-9/11

The conditions al Qaeda enjoyed in the Taliban's Afghanistan in the years and months leading up to the massive attacks of September 11, 2001 are now being replicated in Waziristan, courtesy of a Pakistani government that would rather cave in to terrorists for the purpose of being able to claim agreement to a fleeting, ephemeral respite from attack, rather than actually stand up to those same terrorists and do what is necessary to put a dent in terrorism worldwide, while simultaneously achieving a lasting peace in the region.

Whatever contributions they may have made to the initial effort in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Global War on Terror -- halting as they were, given Pervez Musharraf's overarching concern for the security of his own power rather than for that of his nation or its allies -- Pakistan can no longer be considered an ally in the ongoing fight to rebuild and secure Afghanistan, nor in the effort to defeat global terror networks for the purpose of protecting America and her allies from terrorist attack.

Whatever effort was being made by the Pakistani government to deal with the terrorist and insurgent threat growing once again under its very nose, according to the RAND report:

became more challenging with the rise of an insurgency in Pakistan by a range of militant groups, members of which assassinated Pakistani opposition leader Benazir Bhutto and conducted brazen attacks against the Pakistan army, ISI, and officials from other government agencies.

Militants from Pakistan’s border areas were also linked to a range of international terrorist attacks and plots, such as the July 2005 attacks on London’s mass transit system, the foiled 2006 plot against transatlantic commercial aircraft flights, foiled plots in 2007 in Germany and Denmark, and the 2008 arrests of terrorist suspects in Spain.

The Executive Summary of the NATO report on progress in Afghanistan concludes by saying, "Of course, real challenges remain, and this will be a long-term effort." That statement is absolutely correct.

Unfortunately, Pakistan -- a country which needed a strong showing in the War on Terror if for no other reason than to make amends for its past culpability in the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology to such rogue states as North Korea and Libya -- can no longer be counted on to assist that effort in any significant capacity.