Redstate

Reminds me of that episode of Cheers where Woody's girlfriend Kelly has a French friend who is constantly saying he's going to steal Kelly right out from under Woody's nose. Kelly thought it was cute and funny.

Obama would be Kelly in this example.

Tell me or show me when Obama said "he would meet and talk directly with Ahmadinejad"? Everyone keeps saying he will appease Ahmadinejad, meet with Ahmadinejad, but show me where he has said that can you?

After awhile your receptors grow accustomed and you no longer notice.

The label "appeaser" has been used for too long and it no longer resonates with the American people. It was used against Ronald Reagan because he was dealing with the USSR, and we all know how that turned out. This is one weapon that's almost completely out of bullets.

for that claim. Having voted for Reagan twice pardon me if I find the notion that he was contemporaneously called an "appeaser" just factually untrue.

"A man does what he can and endures what he must."

Here, which by the way is probably one of the worst, fallacious, piecemeal piles of liberal tripe propaganda I have ever read.

"Nec Aspera Terrent"
bene ambula et redambula
Contributor to The Minority Report

Another commenter linked to a post that verifies the claim while writing it off as fallacious, but I have access to LEXIS and there are quite a few articles that mention Conservative Caucus and their campaign (led by the head of CC, Howard Phillips) against Reagan's INF treaty with the USSR.

The best I can come up with in terms of publicly accessible materials is this article discussing Reagan's ability to conduct diplomacy with the USSR against the wishes of conservatives and hardliners. It doesn't actually point out that Howard Phillips did liken Reagan's signing of the treaty to Chamberlain's signing of an accord with Nazi Germany in 1938 - you'll have to get access to LEXIS if you want to verify with the original material.

Incidentally, Phillips is still in charge of Conservative Caucus.

The article linked is appropriately termed "tripe" for a reason. It attempts to use opinion, viewed unrelated to actual comprehensive policies, as a basis for argument. That is not only dishonest but misrepresents what Reagan was trying to achieve.

President Reagan's approach was to talk while building strength. The INF Treaty therefore was part of a larger progressive effort which history proved as enormously successful.

Chamberlain's efforts had none of those qualities thus rendering any comparison grossly flawed. So to further that straw man by saying it was used on Reagan and it no longer "works" furthers the contra intellectual adventurism.

In actuality, to the original point, Obama does resemble Chamberlain in the sense his holistic policies are more aligned with appeasement and consider the projection of strength, shown in efforts such as Iraq, as inferior and unecessary parts of the unconditional dialogue; remembering that "unconditional belies a single facet approach.

"Nec Aspera Terrent"
bene ambula et redambula
Contributor to The Minority Report

Some conservatives accused Reagan of being an appeaser for supporting the INF treaty, but I think we would all agree now that negotiating with the USSR was acceptable foreign policy.

I still don't see the point you're trying to make; appeasement is far more than dialogue or negotiations. It might have actually applied to the INF treaty as we made some concessions in that treaty. Unconditional dialogue in which no concessions are promised is not appeasement by the traditional definition.

From the Left's point of view, Iran is often right and the West is often wrong.

They frequently bring up the West's toppling of Mossadegh in 1953.

They bring up the fact that Israel has nuclear weapons which (they say) can "threaten" the entire region of the Middle East, yet America winks at that.

Joseph Cirincione, who was one of Obama's advisers, had speculated that a possible deal with Iran would be to get Iran to promise not to build any nukes, in exchange for which Israel is forced to dismantle her own nukes. That's an example of the type of mentality underlying the Obama camp. It's driven by extreme cynicism (bordering on conspiracy theorizing) about the West's motives, combined with moral relativism that makes it impossible to condemn the moral position of Iran.

for this. This sort of flies in the face of accepted history. Even Wikipedia says:

In Moscow, the reluctance of the Western nations to go to war against Germany was seen as indicative of a lack of interest in opposing the growing Fascist movement, already exemplified by the events of the Spanish Civil War. The Soviets were not invited to the Munich Conference of September 1938, when the French and British Prime Ministers, Daladier and Chamberlain, agreed to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. As the French had not honored their 1924 treaty with the Czechs, the Soviets suspected that their 1935 alliance pact with France was worthless, and that the West was trying to divert Germany to the East.

In March 1939, Hitler's denunciation of the 1934 German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact was taken by the Soviets as a clear signal of Hitler's aggressive intentions. In April, Soviet foreign minister Litvinov outlined a French-British-Soviet alliance, with military commitments against Fascist powers, but Chamberlain's government procrastinated (partly because the Soviets demanded too much – impossible troop commitments, Soviet annexation of the Baltic states, complete reciprocity, and the right to send troops through Poland). Chamberlain, however, had already on 24 March, along with France, guaranteed the sovereignty of Poland, and subsequently on 25 April signed a Common Defence Pact with Poland. Consequently, Stalin no longer feared that the West would leave the Soviet Union to fight Hitler alone; indeed, if Germany and the West went to war, as seemed likely, the USSR could afford to remain neutral and wait for them to destroy each other.

"A man does what he can and endures what he must."

Interesting read:

http://www.historyman.co.uk/road2war/

Chamberlain's policy was not simply that Britain should give in to Hitler. In fact Chamberlian followed a two track policy of appeasement and rearmament, though he hoped that the former would make the latter unnecessary. He appointed the energetic Leslie Hore-Belisha to the war Office to speed up the modernisation of the army. He rejected Anthony Eden's idea that you had no contact with the dictators until you were ready to fight them. This risked war when you were least prepared for it. Chamberlain had no sympathy with the League of Nations since while the organisation was prepared to debate action he believed that the burden of any action would fall on Britain. Therefore Britain must act independently. The following seven factors help to explain Chamberlain's attitude and why he followed the policy of appeasement.

Fear of Communism - Chamberlain saw Communism as a greater threat to the British Empire than Nazism. Communism destroyed the established order, caused famines and Red Terrors, and was for export. Nazism was aggressive but limited and left capitalism untouched unless the companies were Jewish. There was enough latent anti-semitism in Britain in the 1930s for this not to raise too many eyebrows. From 1936 onwards Stalin talked of forming a common front with the democracies against the Fascist dictators but the Comintern still agitated for world revolution. Given these ambiguities Chamberlain felt that he could not trust the USSR. Also the countries of eastern Europe, especially Poland and Rumania, were unwilling to receive Soviet help fearing that once the Red Army was in their countries they would not leave. Fear of revolution was a strong motive in Conservative circles in the interwar period and many believed that war and revolution went hand in hand, as it had done in many places in 1917-18. Better to avoid war and prevent revolution.

Military Unpreparedness - From 1919 onwards the British army and the RAF were deliberately run down by governments anxious to keep government spending as low as possible. Both forces had become little more than imperial police forces with the army helping to maintain order in Ireland and Pa;estine and the RAF dropping bombs on the "mad Mullah" in the Middle East. The Royal Navy had been seriously diminished by the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and she had to face new more modern navies from Italy and Japan. In particular there was a profound fear of the bomber which was expected to cause very heavy casualties from the moment the war broke out. Chamberlain commented on the vulnerability of London, as his plane flew up the line of the Thames on his way back from the Munich Conferenmce in September 1938. Rearmament had started in 1934 but the pace was slow due to the need to allay popular distrust of large armaments and also to prevent a serious financial crisis caused by excessive public spending.

World Power or European Power? - Britain was not just a European power but a world power with an Empire that stretched from Gibralter all round the world to Hong Kong and back. Germany was not the only potential threat to Imperial stability. In the Mediterranean Mussolini was building up a modern navy and apparently an equally modern and efficient army. In the far east the Japanese had invaded and seized manchuria from China in 1931 and in 1937 they renewed their onslaught on China by bombing Shanghai and raping Nanking. This seemed to pose a much more serous threat to India than the vague threat from Hitler. In any case Chamberlain argued there was no vital British interest at stake in Eastern Europe. These really were quarrels "in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing". Since Britain did not have the strength to take on all these potential aggressors it made sense to Chamberlain to negotiate rather than fight.

Attitude of The Dominions - Australian, New Zealand, South African and Canadian troops had all contributed greatly to britain's war effort in the First World War. Gallipoli and Vimy Ridge were only two areas where Imperial War Graves provided eloquent and moving testimony to the sacrifices of the Dominions. These countries were, by 1936, more apt to be isolationist and in the case of South Africa there was a certain sympathy with the rascist philosophy of the Nazis. Australia and New Zealand were more concerned with the future behaviour of Japan than they were of Germany. Who was to rule Teschen was of little concern to someone in Alice Springs. Canada sheltered behind the isolationism of the USA. In 1937 the Canadian prime Minister, mackenzie King, visited Berlin and reported back to his fellow Imperial Prime Ministers that the German leader meant no harm to the Empire.

Lack of Reliable Allies - It had taken the combined forces of the British Empire, France and her Empire, Russia and the USA four bloody and destructive years to bring Germany to the point of surrender. In 1937 Chamberlain saw little hope of renewing this allied force. Russia was now Communist and of doubtful help. France was sliding more and more into an undeclared civil war. In February 1934 there had been serious riots on the streets of paris and from then onwards there had been grave political instability in France. Right wing paramilitary groups such as Action Francaise and the more sinister Cagoulards were determined to undermine French democracy and prevent another war. When Socialists and Communists formed a Popular front Government in 1936 there were many French conservatives who boldly announced that Hitler was preferrable to the leadership of the French socialist Leon Blum. The French army were defeatist in attitude preferring to shelter behind the Maginot Line than further develop the ideas of Colonel De Gaulle on modern tank warfare. To defeat Hitler vthe UK neede a strong continental arm. This was something the French could not provide. After 1918 the Americans withdrew into isolationism and would have nothing to do with European affairs except utter fine sounding platitudes (the Kellog-Briand Pact). Such actions irritated Chamberlain since they offered the maximum of distraction with the minimum of support. How to react to the USAwas one of the factors that caused Chamberlain's breach with Anthony Eden and the latter's replacement by Lord Halifax

Popular Opinion - In the absence of opinion polls it is difficult to establish exactly what the British people felt about war but certainly the popular reaction to Munich, responses to the League of Nations Peace ballot of 1935, and the result of the Fulham By Election, all seem to indicate popular suspicion of rearmament and war. The Labour party criticised the government for its policy of appeasement but was not prepared to support rearmament to give British opposition teeth.

Sympathy with Hitler and Mussolini - There was an undercurrent of synpathy towards boith the dictators in certain social circles in Britain. There were a number of groups dedicated to improving Anglo-German relations, such as the Anglo-German Fellowship and The Link. There was a widely held belief that Germany had been harshly treated by the Treaty of Versailles and that it was now time to make amends. Hitler had restored German respectability, he was a former First World war soldier who had on many occasions spoken of his hatred of further wars, and he was securely anti Communist. Likewise Mussolini was seen by many as a patriotic Italian who had brought much neede stability to Italy and made the trains run on time. Also he might be a useful bulwark to Hitler if he could be worked round to the Franco-British camp. Chamberlain was in secret cporrespondence with Mussolini through his siter in law, Mrs Ida Chamberlain and this was the second factor in the rupture with Eden.

"Broadly speaking, liberalism emphasizes individual rights and equality of opportunity. ... including extensive freedom of thought and speech, limitations on the power of governments, the rule of law, the free exchange of ideas, a market or mixed economy,

If the leaders of England and France had been doing thier jobs they would not have been unprepared any moron not in total denial could see what was going on. If they had acted much earlier in the 30's Munich would have never happened, but because they were cowards who took the eazy road they allowed ww2 to happen and hold equal blame with Hitler and Germany.

Being a coward is not equal in guilt or blame to the actual evil being committed. It is wrong, but it is not as wrong.

"Hey, I call 'em like I see 'em. I'm a whale biologist."

Is not on the hands of Congress/libs I belive it is. Just as the blood of millions is on the hands of the anti DDT cult.

The leaders in England/ France/ USA had stewardship and they failed they have accountability that is not washed away because Hitler was a bad guy. Where much is given much is expected.

You are right that where much is given much is expected, but not stopping a murder is still not as evil as committing a murder. And I completely agree that there is blood on the hands of Congress for SE Asia, but that does not make them equal to the men who actually made the order to pull the trigger.

"Hey, I call 'em like I see 'em. I'm a whale biologist."

May not get you fried, but holding a gun during the robbery will.

I see England/France as the latter when the nut job opens up on the hepless teller.

The bloodletting of World War I caused a tremendous upsurge in cynicism and pacifism among the Europeans, including the British.

Intellectuals, pundits, and philosophers, started writing screeds that "We live in a sick society" and "War is never a good thing" and "We must disarm" and "If we don't finish war, war will finish us". Antiwar books and antiwar movies ("All Quiet on the Western Front") became bestsellers. Sound familiar? It's the same retreat into cynicism and malaise that America endured after Vietnam.

On top of that, there was fear that massive strategic bombing of cities, which had been tried only sporadically in World War I, would lead to a collapse of civilization. The big fear was poison gas bombs dropped on cities by airplanes.

On top of that, you had the worldwide Depression of the 1930s. Intellectuals started writing that democracy was weak and decadent, not worth bothering with anymore. In America, Marxism was chic among the upscale sophisticates; in France, Fascism was chic.

Into that climate of cynicism, fear, despair and confusion, nobody was interested in rearmament--or in any other national crusades for any other purpose.

That's why as a conservative, I still have to give Franklin Roosevelt credit for having begun to revive the economy and to institute a rearmament program when just about everybody else was opposed to it, some even in his own party. France had no such leadership, even though they needed it even more than we--and they paid a heavy price.

France had one of the largest and most mechanized Pre-WWII armies in the world. Guderian even used their armor formations as a model for Germany's. Sadly the French COMPLETELY underestimated the terrain capabilities of the Germans.

“The difference between a Republican and a Democrat is the Democrat is a cannibal -- they have to live off each other--while the Republicans, why, they live off the Democrats.” --- Will Rogers

but it seems, in large measure, to contradict your post.

"A man does what he can and endures what he must."

Wow. You really think?

1) What I wrote: "They saw communism as their biggest threat, and liked having a rabid anti-communist between them and Russia."

What it said "Fear of Communism - Chamberlain saw Communism as a greater threat to the British Empire than Nazism."

2)What I wrote: "Communism was spreading through the UK so there is good reason Conservatives and business leaders felt this way."

What it said "the Comintern still agitated for world revolution. Fear of revolution was a strong motive in Conservative circles in the interwar period "

3) What I wrote: "The British people were in no mood for a war either militarily, financially or popularly."

What it said:"Military Unpreparedness - From 1919 onwards the British army and the RAF were deliberately run down by governments anxious to keep government spending as low as possible.

it is difficult to establish exactly what the British people felt about war but certainly the popular reaction to Munich, responses to the League of Nations Peace ballot of 1935, and the result of the Fulham By Election, all seem to indicate popular suspicion of rearmament and war."

4) Don't forget, Chamberlain was greeted like a rock star when he came back from Munich. He was wildly popular.

He wasn't as confident in private, but felt he had bought some time to re-arm. The country still would not go along with re-arming politically.

"Broadly speaking, liberalism emphasizes individual rights and equality of opportunity. ... including extensive freedom of thought and speech, limitations on the power of governments, the rule of law, the free exchange of ideas, a market or mixed economy,

Would it be fair to say that they were practicing an "enemy of my enemy is my friend" type policy but underestimated the befriended enemy?

Kinda like our friendship and support of Iraq and Saddam Hussein during the 1980s when they were fighting Iran?

In my opinion Chamberlain still delayed for too long and was far too optimistic that he could buy off Hitler. In retrospect I also think Czechoslovakia would would have been a better place for France and Britain to make a stand as the heart of the Czech defense systems were in the Sudetenland. In contrast, Poland while a much bigger country, contained a large amount of open plains (as opposed to the mountainous Sudetenland), and was probably a much easier target for the Wehrmacht.

All that having been said, while Chamberlain was probably a good bit self-delusional about his ability to buy off Hitler, we should recognize that what seems an easy choice for us in hindsight, was not such an easy choice for the British at the time. Given the political climate in Britain in the '30s and the fact that the most horrible, exhausting war that Britain had ever fought in its history was only 20 years in its past, I think we need to recognize that Chamberlain was somewhat caught between a rock and hard place. I think Churchill would have acted much differently than Chamberlain in '38, but there was no way the Conservative Party or the British people were going to let Churchill get anywhere near 10 Downing in '38. Not until their back was against the wall, would the British call upon Churchill.

NC

In the days after Munich was perhaps the most unpopular man in all of Britain.

"Broadly speaking, liberalism emphasizes individual rights and equality of opportunity. ... including extensive freedom of thought and speech, limitations on the power of governments, the rule of law, the free exchange of ideas, a market or mixed economy,

People sometimes forget that Churchill was never/has never been viewed in the UK in quite the same way he is viewed here in the U.S.

In '38 the Brits largely though Churchill was a crazy old hangover from the Victorian era who was caught between his two twin obsessions of Hitler and Gandhi.

NC

Prior to Munich they had a very respectable army, including armor units, and of course their armaments industry was top-notch. If Britain and France hadn't caved... well, they'll be arguing that one for the next seventy years, too.

The Fuzzy Puppy of the VRWC. I've been usurped!

Would be one less to go east, west or south. The Germans would have had some more experienced units but like Lee attrition was not on their side.

Putting aside the fact that giving countries to historically aggressive nation/states (i.e. they ended a war less than one generation ago) is not a good idea.

The smart move would have been to force the Germans to attack.

Britain and France were totally willing to let other people get taken over by Germany so they could avoid war. It wasn't until Poland was invaded, they finally decided to go to war (or realized they were next). There is nothing reasonable about letting other people be "annexed", unless you think being a coward is reasonable. Should we have been reasonable with Saddam Hussein and let him keep Kuwait? I think Kuwait would disagree.

"Hey, I call 'em like I see 'em. I'm a whale biologist."

No, I dont' think that was it...

The "coward" French had just taken over 1.5 million deaths from WWI and over 4 million wounded. The British lost something like a million dead in WWI.

It's easy to forget how bloody WWI was and how desperate people were to avoid another round.

"Broadly speaking, liberalism emphasizes individual rights and equality of opportunity. ... including extensive freedom of thought and speech, limitations on the power of governments, the rule of law, the free exchange of ideas, a market or mixed economy,

One important thing to remember: Hitler wanted a war. If Neville Chamberlain had not given Hitler the Sudetenland, the war would have started then. Instead, it started a year later. During the extra year, Britain was busy rearming (as was Germany - Germany was stronger for waiting a year but so was the West). It is not true, as this article says, that Munich made Hitler brave enough to start a war.

Another important thing to remember: later in the war, when it was clear the Germans would lose, Hitler was telling someone why it all went wrong, and said the big mistake he made was...at the Munich Conference. Hitler thought that not starting a war over the Sudetenland lost WWII for the Germans.

Chamberlain said both the following, according to Wikiquote:

How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing. It seems still more impossible that a quarrel which has already been settled in principle should be the subject of war.

He is referring to the Sudetenland, but might as well be referring to Belgium from WWI, the ensuring of the neutrality of which was Britain's reason for entering the war. Presented for everyone to draw their own conclusions.

I stick to the view I have always held that Hitler missed the bus in September 1938. He could have dealt France and ourselves a terrible, perhaps a mortal, blow then. The opportunity will not recur.

Letter to someone during the war. Here he is agreeing with Hitler - what we deride as appeasement was strategically helpful to the West according to people on both sides.

I would take any self-interested statements made by Chamberlain or Hitler with a large, large helping of salt. I agree that Britain and France were not in a great position to fight in '38, but as you note, Hitler also was not fully up to strength either. Moreover, the Sudetenland would have probably been a tougher nut to crack for Hitler than Poland was, given the strong Czech defenses in the mountainous Sudentenland. Hitler would have also faced a more prepared Poland to his North Eastern Flank, while the Wehrmacht bruised itself against Czechoslovakia.

NC

Look, I don't think Chamberlain made the right decision. In fact, given the information available to Chamberlain at the time, I think he should have fairly reasonably concluded Hitler was a lying bas%$@&d and that Hitler was just playing for time. It is also somewhat cynical for Chamberlain to have sold out Czechoslovakia to simply save Britain.

But . . . , I understand why Chamberlain did what he did. The British people were in no mood to fight in '38. Germany, despite having been beat up worse than France and Britain in WW1 , and having been damaged greatly by the Great Depression, was the economic, industrial and demographic powerhouse of Europe. There is simply no way that Britain could have taken Germany straight up in a war (though I suppose if Britain could have brought a large number of Indian troops into play in Europe, I might be inclined to revise that conclusion). It was also unclear how committed France was to fighting in '38.

People deceive themselves sometimes, and I think Chamberlain and the British deceived themselves about Hitler in '38. But I understand why they did that. Britain in '38 was near the end of its imperial apex, it was overstretched and had seen vast numbers of its youth die in the fields of France. Given its historical aversion to lengthy entanglements on the Continent (which WW I probably helped to confirm), its easy to understand why the British did not want to commit to a fight over a country that had only existed for 20 years.

NC

"There is nothing reasonable about letting other people be "annexed", unless you think being a coward is reasonable. Should we have been reasonable with Saddam Hussein and let him keep Kuwait? I think Kuwait would disagree."

Should we go to war over China and Tibet? How about go to the Olympics? Even that's too harsh?

For Britain and France, going to war with Germany would be about the same as us going to war with China - not us going to war with Iraq. It would mean, literally, taking on millions in casualties.

Is Tibet or Kuwait worth a 5 million American dead?

NO!

"Broadly speaking, liberalism emphasizes individual rights and equality of opportunity. ... including extensive freedom of thought and speech, limitations on the power of governments, the rule of law, the free exchange of ideas, a market or mixed economy,

(Or maybe good choice if you can thus convince everyone that I'm a freakin' loon. I don't know) I don't have a problem going to war to liberate people, even a small number of people. The number of dead in the civil war far outweighed the good of abolishing slavery by your standards. (Don't get started on a "it wasn't about slavery" argument, it'll just get ugly). I really don't have a problem going to war with China. It's really easy to make that call when you aren't the one being oppressed, isn't it?

"Hey, I call 'em like I see 'em. I'm a whale biologist."

Then why did they bother to come to Poland's side? Because of a treaty? Is keeping your treaty more important than 5 million lives? Why is keeping a treaty more important than liberating a people? You and I must have waaaaaay different principles.

"Hey, I call 'em like I see 'em. I'm a whale biologist."

While most well-informed British and French should have known by '38 that Hitler was an anti-semitic demagogue, they did not yet know that Hitler was bent on wiping out Jews as a people or enslaving the Slavs. Those same British and French did, however, have very recent experience in fighting the Germans, and it was an experience that they were not eager to repeat. World War I nearly wrecked both France and Germany. Both France and Britain wanted to avoid a replay of World War I if at all possible.

I am not arguing that Chamberlain did the right thing at Munich, but I would not be too harsh in judging the British/French in '38. They remembered all to well having gone to war over a small incident involving the Austro-Hungarians and Serbs in 1914, and they did not want to see history as repeating itself over what they then saw as small border incident between Germany and a country that was bearly 20 years old.

NC

I'm not arguing from hindsight, and I don't think I'm being too harsh on them. I'm not saying "WWII is all their fault", I'm saying it is naive now, it was naive then, circumstances may lessen the culpability but you can't make stupid smart just because you were war weary.

I could repeat to you a nearly identical situtation with Iran and Israel now, and it would be just as naive for us to think that we could just give and give and give to Iran and eventually they'll play nice and leave Israel alone. WWII is not the only lesson we have that says maniacle nuts can't be appeased.

Being war weary may have been their motivation to appease, but it doesn't make them reasonable. It has always been unreasonable and it always will be.

And by the way, I'm not hanging on the anti-semitism part as my only basis for saying they should have seen him as a nut. He wanted the Czechs and Austria. How was that not a tip off that he was a problem? If (when) China takes Taiwan, are we going to say "That's ok. We don't want war with them." Then Japan. "Well that's kinda like extended China, right? Not worth war." Then Indonesia. "Well they look Chinese, right? Still not worth war." At what point do you say, "holy crap, they are a real problem"?

This isn't about hindsight, this is about human nature and how we are supposed to understand it.

"Hey, I call 'em like I see 'em. I'm a whale biologist."

I was not saying Chamberlain made the right decision, I was saying I understand his decision. That being said its easy to paint Chamberlain as the useless, cowardly idiot and Churchill as the brave voice of courage in 2008, but that was not at all how it was viewed by the British people in 1938. By the way, I say that as a huge admirer of Churchill. But in looking at history, you understand the context the historical figures were operating in that time.

You know in some ways, Britain was extremely fortunate in World War II. Had Hitler not invaded Russia in June of '41 and then stupidly declared war on America in December of '41, it is quite possible to imagine a Churchill government not surviving and a more accomodationist Prime Minister replacing Churchill and then treating for peace with the Germans. From where I am sitting, without Russian and American assistance, I simply do not see how Britain could have withstood a prelonged U boat siege from the Germans and a bombing campaign from the Luftwaffe.

Not too ramble, but every situation is unique. For the liberals, I would say not every conflict is Vietnam and for my fellow Conservatives, I would say that not every enemy is Hitler.

NC

In 1938, a Gallup poll of Americans taken shortly after the Munich Pact showed that some 60% of Americans believed that Chamberlain was right to give the Sudetenland to Hitler to avoid war.

It's interesting to read the Gallup polls of that era and see how American public opinion finally shifted toward war.

An interesting fact that is rarely dwelt on, is what the polls showed in 1945. By the summer of 1945, Americans were becoming weary of the war. Despite Pearl Harbor and despite all the pro-war propaganda, there was a noticeable downtick in support for the war. It's possible that support for World War II would have collapsed, had the war lasted as long as the Iraq War has now lasted. By 1947, exhortations to "Stay the course" would have begun to fail.

Americans don't like to fight long wars. Not even World War II. They don't mind the casualties and the cost as much as the TIME involved.

Whatever the merits of your analysis, it seems to indicate that tying to win faster is better than hoping to win slowly.

We haven't really tried to win two of the last three wars, as in, tried whatever it takes to win decisively.

Democrats: Abandoning Allies, One Country at a Time.

Your unmentioned premise is that the results were not easily foreseeable by right thinking people, and that history didn't already have plenty of examples where diplomacy against an aggressor bent on domination did not work out. Your very claim of a fallacy depends on a blank slate where liberal notions of appeasement and conservative notions of peace through strength are initially considered equal. Perhaps the order of the statement "it was wrong as the result clearly showed" may irk you as far as "logic" goes, but it is clearer to most people than saying "it was wrong as some other historic example clearly showed". Frankly it is not much different than saying "Jumping off a cliff was wrong as the results clearly showed." You may not consider it proof, but it is strong evidense and a reasonable illustration. It is not fallacious.

Not that you particularly bug me, Default Attorney, but just because I can't stand it when people do it, I'll mention it here. Simply mentioning "fallacy" and some hoity-tioty Latin lingo to label it when you are in fact secretly substituting premises may work in arguments against most people (see the absurdly insulting "Spaghetti monster" analogy), but it won't work on me.

"Hey, I call 'em like I see 'em. I'm a whale biologist."

Any person who thought diplomacy would work over the long term with Germany in '38 was being willfully blind. As I have argued elsewhere in this thread, I understand and sympathize with the decisions made by France and Britain at Munich, but I think those decisions were wrong (even based on the information available to the French and British at the time).

You are right that the full horrors of Nazism would only reveal themselves later, but there was plently of information available to Chamberlain that should have alerted him to the shape of things that were to come from Herr Hitler.

NC

And this kind of sums up my reply to you above. So I'm not sure we disagree.

"Hey, I call 'em like I see 'em. I'm a whale biologist."

I am simply saying history is complicated and the world is complicated. Not everything is a neat analogy. I think Obama would be profoundly wrong about Iran, but I don't think that means we should invade Iran tomorrow (and I don't think thats your argument).

We may want to practice some type of modified containment policy with Iran, akin to how we handled the USSR during the Cold War. Iran is a huge country, both from a geographic and a population standpoint. Dealing with Iraq is a cake walk in comparison to dealing with Iran.

NC

we may want to pull a Clinton (yes, something I actually give the guy credit for, even though I'm bitter about it on principle) and simply work captalism and communication into their nation as we did with China. It'll be a long time before we can actually conclude that the Clinton policy of getting China addicted to capitalism and getting them online will actually transform their nation to have good govt, but it appears to have made ground. A similar strategy may also gain ground in Iran (if Iran isn't so stupid as to start a war before that).

"Hey, I call 'em like I see 'em. I'm a whale biologist."

Though again, China and Iran are profoundly different. I don't think there are a lot of good options with Iran. They have oil, they have people and they probably have some support (at least behind the scenes) from Russia.

I think the best we can do is to contain them, until Iranians get tired of living with the Mullahs. We need to be forceful in dealing with Iranian proxies, we need to clear in our message as to the consequence of any attack on their neighbors, including Israel. If they sponsor an act of terrorism, ala 9-11, we will be forced to take action. But I don't think a pre-emptive attack is the best option at this point.

NC

Two things that could have been understood, given a thousand years of European history, was that it's never wise to let your military guard down. And that treaties are made to be broken.

What was unconscionable, was for the Great Powers to put their faith in signing treaties rather than maintaining powerful armies and navies as deterrents to aggression. Wilson is partly to blame for this; the League of Nations was his idea. But the Kellogg-Briand Pact represented the kind of "New Age/Kumbaya" thinking that we saw again with the flower children in Berkeley in the 1960s.

In the 1930s, when fears rose of strategic bombing of cities, the right answer was improved air defense and civil defense measures, NOT appeasement.

Only the cynicism and bitterness caused by World War I could have produced this sea-change in European attitudes.

In the entire history of modern civilization, no piece of paper has ever stopped a bullet.

NC

"hoity-toity" or even "fancy shmancy" people is reserved for the Spaghetti Monster afficianados. Hate that stupid analogy.

Back to logic: It is logical to make the claim because (and this is my premise of course) it was easily forseeable, just as so many things like Iran going to war with Israel is easily forseeable today. People can claim they didn't see it coming, but you'd have to be a fool, in my opinion.

"All I'm saying that it is not correct to rationalize (or demonize) decisions in the past based on knowledge we did not have at our disposal at the time."

You can claim it wasn't easily forseeable, but that is your premise and I reject it. Because I reject your premise (something that I believe a reasonable person can do), your claim that it is a fallacy no longer stands. Because I believe it was forseeable, I can then say the actions were wrong as the results illustrate that any good that may have been intended was far outweighed by the easily forseeable results.

Also, and this is going a bit beyond our current argument, there is guilt to be found in unintended consequences of a bad action as well. My personal favorite example (and atheists will probably not agree with me) is Karl Marx. He wrote a hugely evil piece of work that denied nearly all Truth he had been taught by society. He may have had the best of intentions (I'm not so certain of that), but he was told the Truth, he rejected it and his actions resulted indirectly (but most definitely) in the deaths of millions (billions?) of people. He has some guilt for his arrogance. Now to break it down to a simpler less inflammatory example, I tell my kid not to take cookies from the cookie jar, they decide to steal one and in the process bust the cookie jar. Normally I wouldn't punish my kid for random accidents, but because they broke it while doing an action I told them not to, they get an extra punishment. That is not unjust. So in doing something selfish (appeasing a nut job and selling out people to oppression because you want to avoid war) even though it may seem like "not a big deal" at the time, it still receives some of the guilt for the unintended but directly related consequences of their bad actions.

"Hey, I call 'em like I see 'em. I'm a whale biologist."

"your claim that it is a fallacy no longer stands..." given the non acceptance of your premise. You can on claim a fallacy in someone's argument if the route from their premises to their conclusion was illogical. Otherwise you can simply say their argument is not sound because of some premise you disagree with. Either way, given my premise, the statement is not illogical.

"Hey, I call 'em like I see 'em. I'm a whale biologist."

stupid hands not typing what brain is thinking....
Should read:

"You can not claim a fallacy in someone's argument if the route from their premises to their conclusion was illogical. You can simply ...."

"Hey, I call 'em like I see 'em. I'm a whale biologist."

"Hey, I call 'em like I see 'em. I'm a whale biologist."

it's late in the day.

is a Latin based word too :)

All I'm saying is that imposing a narrative on history (of "inevitable" cause and effect in hindsight) is a dangerous game. Saying that the opening of the second front in Normandy helped lead to victory, is one thing. Saying that diplomacy would/would not have been futile, given the violent war that followed is just not possible to prove/disprove. And, by extension, using it as an analogy to use in the future is of dubious value, especially considering that almost all of the known variables (who, what, where, when) have changed, and we don't even know what we don't know we don't know (or in the words of Rumsfeld, the "unknown unknowns").

I agree with you that people are horrible at predicting in the real world. The Israeli/Palestinian conflict was referred to as "a simple problem" sixty years ago. I think it was in 1900 or so that the head of the us patent office said that there would be no more significant patentable discoveries. But I don't think anyone could have seen the advent of say, the ipod, back then.

I don't think I see the relation with Marx, or the "evil" work you're referring to (communist manifesto or das kapital?), or what "Truth" you are referring to. If you're suggesting that Marx was the "cause" of Stalin or Mao's internal purges, I would refer you to my caution on narratives. Many people have used books (or what you might refer to as THE Good Book) for bad intentions.

yep, dito

Why won't the historical distortion of the interwar period and WW2 ever end? I couldn't be more sick of listening to politicians "Godwinize" every single debate by referencing Hitler and the Third Reich? The comparisons are very rarely apt.

Flagstaff, you're completely ignoring the century of history that preceeded Munich, the century of European ethnic nationalism. Ethnic nation states were held up as the new and best model for political organization- the "liberals" of the time agitated for the break-up of old multi-ethnic dynastic states (like Austria-Hungary), to be replaced with ethnic nation states. Membership in an ethnic group was largely determined by language. Thus, it was held that all Polish speakers should have an independant and unified Polish country, all Italian speakers should have a unified, Italian speaking country, all German speakers should have a unified, German speaking country, etc.

The current German national anthem (Deutschland ueber alles) was written in the mid 19th century, decades before the advent of a unified German state. It called longingly for a unfied Germany, explicitly setting the borders on the Maas and on the Memel, on the Etsch (Adige) and on the Belt- meaning all the German speaking lands that currently fall from Maastricht to Lithuania (although the Soviet ethnic cleansing that took place after the war means that there are no Germans on the Memel today) to the Danish border to the Italian Alps. This was a nationalism specifically based on the theory that the langauge spoken was the key to ethnic and national identity. This pan-Germanism remained a powerful political force up until 1945, and played a key role in the rise of the Nazis (as explained below)

The Germans were not alone in this type of nationalist ideology. It was the norm; in fact, it was President Wilson's explicit goal in helping craft the Treaty of Versailles. The new Eastern European states carved out of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia were organized alond language-based ethno-nationalist lines. The lone exception, of course, was Germany. If the German nation was given the same treatment at Versailles as other nations (and it was a bit hypocritalcal of Wilson not to advocate for this, as he repeatedly claimed that the U.S. was at war not with the German "nation", but with the German "government"), Germany would have greatly increased in size. As this was unacceptable, Germans were not allowed the right of national self-determination. Parts of eestern Germany were shorn off and given to Belgium and France, large parts of eastern Germany (including Danzig) were given to Poland, and Austria (which called itself "German Austria" immediately after the war) was forbidden by treaty from joining with Germany, despite the fact that over 90% of Austrians voted to join Germany in a referrendum that took place shortly after the war ended.

This denial of German self determination was taken as a grave insult to German national pride. It remained an incredibly painful issues throughout the Weimar era, and the Nazis rose to power in part out of that desire to regain the land that was rightfully theirs and to free their German brethern from foreign rule. The Nazis promised to do that.

Once in power, that's exactly what they did. They first reasserted authority over the Rheinland, then annexed Austria. The rest of Europe, though a bit leery, were willing to let Germany do this for a few reasons- one was fear of Stalin, one was reluctance to go to war, but one important reason was because they thought that the Germans had a good argument to that land under the prevailing theories of ethnic nationalism and self determination. The rest of Europe wasn't ready to go to war with Germany to prevent the Germans from taking land that many felt rightfully belonged to Germany anyway.

That's a main reason why when the Sudeten crisis arose, many still didn't want to go to war over it- they were still just annexing German people who, by the ideology of the day, should've been part of Germany anyway. Afterall, the Sudeten Germans discriminated against by the Czechs and strongly supported joining Germany. The main argument at Munich against giving the Sudetenland to Germany was that the Sudeten mountains provided the Czech's only natural defenses against Germany and that Czechoslovakia would be defenseless against Germany without their protection. In the end, the pro-nationalist arguments helped win the day for Hitler, and Chamberlain and the rest aquiesed to allowing the Sudeten Germans join Germany.

The annexation of Sudetenland per se wasn't that controversial, and it wasn't what was unreasonable about Munich. What was unreasonable is that Chamberlain overestimated the extent that irridentism played in Hitler's designs for the Sudetenland and underestimated the Nazi desire for conquest of non-German lands. Hitler proved that the Nazis wanted more than just a unified German shortly after Munich, when they proved to Munich naysayers right by swiftly entering the Czech lands and conquering what had been Czechoslovakia. Whereas the Sudeten annexation was palatable because of the undercurrents of national self determination, this naked conquest of non-German land was unacceptable to the rest of the world and clearly revealed the Third Reich as the expansionist evil we know it as today. With that realization made crystal clear, the European powers were no longer willing to deal with Hitler in 1939, when he started agitating for the return of German lands that were given to Poland at Versailles. Realizing that the Nazis would not be sated with merely getting back their German lands, Britain and France guaranteed Poland's borders. In other words, the British had learned the lessons of Munich: no matter how much sense that some of Hitler's arguments made, he was not to be trusted, as he had expansionist goals far beyond merely uniting Germany.

Stalin, on the other hand, was ready to bargain. The USSR and the Nazis signed Ribbentrop-Molotov, the Nazis invaded Poland, the Soviets followed shortly thereafter, and the rest is history.

Ramsey's article was not off base in that regard. The German annexation of the Sudetenland, if taken by itself, was not unreasonable per the prevailing ideology of the age (one that was shared and encouraged by the US and one that had been applied in Versailles to practically every other major ethnic group in Europe). Now what does the Munich situation have to do with current day politics? It can give some broad lessons (don't trust dictators too much when negotiating; if a dictator rights a political memoir spelling out what he wants to do, then you should read it and take it seriously), but it doesn't really fit well with anything if you try to make too close of a connection.

Nazi & WW2 comparisons are almost always brought up to make the other side look bad rather than to make a cogent point. This often works wonders, as few Americans know anything about central European history pre-1939. It's not all our fault- just go to the local book store and look at the German history section. 90%+ is dedicated to the Nazis and WW2, 25 years out of a national history spanning 2000+. You cannot understand the Nazis without understanding what came before them. The politicians of bother parties take advantage of this lack of understanding either willingly or unwittingly (as most of our political leaders probably don't have a grasp of the history). That produces an endless parade of stupid WW2/Nazi comparions and slanders- very few of which add to the understanding of current day geopolitics.

I don't mean to pick on you, Flagstaff. This is just something that has been bothering me for years (usually with the Dems calling the Repubs Nazis), and I think that it needs to be said.

I forgot to proofread my last post before posting.

FWIW, as someone who reads history for fun and not as a profession, I really enjoyed Richard Evans' first two books in his planned three volume history of the Third Reich ("The Coming of the Third Reich" and "The Third Reich in Power"). I think if anyone on this board is interested in getting a very good overview of some of the issues leading to the rise of Nazi Germany and the coming of WWII in Europe, reading Evans would be a pretty good place to start.

Based on you comment above, I am pretty sure you are far beyond that, but I think Republicans and Conservatives should really think on the points you raise. There is a problem in tackling issues in current events by arguing by historical analogy.

NC

Thank you.

A few other suggestions for those interested in learning more about the "whys" of WW2:

"The German Dictatorship" by Karl Dietrich Bracher

"History of Modern Germany- Reformation - 1945" Hajo Holborn

"Wages of Destruction"- Adam Tooze

"The Nazi Voter- The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany"- Thomas Childers

"The Nazi Conscience"- Claudia Koonz

Unfortunately between my real job, and helping my saint of a wife with a 6 year old and a 6 month old, getting to my reading list is a pretty tall order.

I did however just finish a wonderful book by John Toland "The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire" that gave a very good overview of the reasons for Japan's entry into war against the U.S. and the European colonial powers. Anyone who is looking to get a view of the Pacific side of the Axis should start there.

NC

But my response is tough cookies Germany you lost the war.

It’s my same response to the Gaza strip, Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula.

Any assumption that starting a war and loosing will leave a country with status quo ante is absurd.

Shoot why didn’t they just give him the German speaking half of Switzerland also.

The time to stop him was entering the Rhine.

"I don't mean to pick on you, Flagstaff."

I don't consider it picking on me. By addressing me, You encouraged me to read your comment, which was very good. And I admit that I'm no expert on history of any period.

I must surely have completely ignored a lot of history in my three short paragraphs, half of which were quotations of Bruce Ramsey that I was refuting by sarcasm. I wasn't trying to put it in historical perspective.

But let's put in some different historical perspective. Many of the same people who would agree with Ramsey that "annexation of the Sudetenland... was not unreasonable per the prevailing ideology of the age" are also ready to give Mexico credibility in its reconquista claims; claims that the US acquired our southwestern states "illegally." But the land of those states was certainly acquired according to the prevailing ideology of that age, which was about 90 years before the 1930's--cash money paid from a position of strength. As you wrote, "politicians of bother(sic) parties take advantage of this lack of understanding...." And they certainly don't restrict themselves to historical ignorance, either. It's rampant in Senatorial hearings regarding matters economic.

"few Americans know anything about central European history pre-1939."

Obviously correct. Heck, few of us know as much about post-1939 Europe as we think we know. Education regarding history of all eras is terrible in all public schools, and it's been terrible since at least the 1950's. Perhaps it's even getting worse every year. Perhaps that's understandable, because of the sheer volume of history that's available to teach--time constraints mean that choices must be made. It is too bad that some fresh analysis hasn't been applied to the shortcomings in how those choices have been made. (I looked at the American history textbook my daughter will use in 7th grade next year. They go from pre-Columbian times to almost the present in one year. Not surprisingly, not much is covered in detail.)

And of course, 20/20 hindsight makes Chamberlain look worse now than he may have looked then. But just because it may have been "reasonable" doesn't mean it wasn't appeasement.

Just as many people supported Chamberlain's actions, there were also many who were already convinced that Hitler was not to be trusted. Self-preservation is also a time-honored ideology of all ages. Some of us seem to have forgotten that one. Notice that I didn't say "Democrats" or "Obama." Yet they might jump to that conclusion.

Democrats: Abandoning Allies, One Country at a Time.